Geopolitics in 2026 has kickstarted with the United States’ rapid, targeted strikes in Venezuela and announcing the capture of Nicolás Maduro within hours. The legal framing through the “Cartel de los Soles” designation is largely instrumental: Venezuela does not produce cocaine, and most trafficking through the country mainly moves toward Europe. The designation primarily enables military action without congressional approval. It also serves a second purpose: combined with visible U.S. military pressure, it creates a powerful incentive structure inside the Venezuelan state. Once the U.S. defines a “terrorist cartel,” Trump can label any official as part of it – or exempt anyone who aligns with him. This mechanism could quickly generate new loyalties within the system, producing a leadership class dependent on and responsive to Trump. In this environment, the emergence of a new regime aligned with U.S. interests is more likely than a transition led by elected figures such as elected President González or Nobel laureate María Corina Machado.
Trump’s approach
Analytical attempts to impose legalistic coherence on Trump’s actions are fundamentally flawed. Trump does not seek consistency, and he has no intention of being coherent across cases. He acts transactionally, not doctrinally. Trump can justify intervention in Venezuela with a hemispheric argument and defend Taiwan because he has interests there. For him, these positions are not contradictory – they are simply different cases with different payoffs.
Trump’s broader pattern remains consistent. He avoids high‑risk, open‑ended conflicts and instead chooses fast, decisive operations with a clear personal payoff – economic leverage, political advantage, or strategic signaling. He relies on personalized adversaries to frame interventions. Maduro provided the necessary “villain,” enabling a narrative of decisive action. Without such a figure, escalation becomes harder, which is why scenarios like Greenland are less likely unless a similar antagonist emerges.
Having now achieved two rapid military successes, Trump has found a tool he trusts and will continue to use until one operation fails. Venezuela offered ideal conditions: a collapsing state, a delegitimized regime dependent on repression, and external support from Russia, Iran, and China. It also provided a low‑cost opportunity for Washington to reassert hemispheric dominance – effectively a revival of the Monroe Doctrine, or what can be described as the “Donroe Doctrine.”
The message to China, Russia and Iran
The operation sends a broader message to China, Russia, and Iran: Trump is willing to act militarily when it suits him, without international approval and without concern for global criticism.
For China, this does not make a move on Taiwan easier. Trump has interests there and will defend them. But smaller Southeast Asian states become more vulnerable if he sees no benefit in their protection.
For Russia, one lesson is that clients dependent on Russian weapons are exposed. Chinese systems – especially electronic warfare and fighter aircraft – are positioned to fill in for Russian equipment, as seen recently in Iran.
The now repeatedly demonstrated global shortage of capable ground‑based air defense systems also creates a strong market opening.
For Iran, Trump may support protesters if it aligns with his interests, but regional resistance makes intervention far more complex than in Venezuela.
Oil markets
A key economic dimension of the Venezuela operation is its impact on global oil markets. In the short term, prices may rise due to uncertainty and temporary supply disruptions. But if the U.S. stabilizes production and brings Venezuelan barrels back to market, prices are likely to fall. Venezuela holds some of the world’s largest proven oil reserves – far larger than Russia’s – and even partial normalization of output would shift global supply dynamics. Russian oil currently accounts for roughly ten percent of global production, but its reserves are declining and extraction costs are rising. Venezuela’s reserves are vast but underdeveloped. If U.S. influence unlocks even a fraction of this capacity, it would put sustained downward pressure on global prices. Lower oil prices directly undermine Russia’s war‑financing model, which depends on high export revenues and limited competition. A revitalized Venezuelan oil sector – aligned with U.S. interests – would therefore weaken Moscow’s strategic position far beyond Latin America.
Europe must step up
For Europe, the implications are immediate. The United States cannot simultaneously stabilize Ukraine, the Middle East, the Sahel, the Indo‑Pacific, and now Venezuela, and under Trump, U.S. engagement will follow his priorities, not shared transatlantic values.
Europe must therefore communicate the costs of any move on Greenland very clearly behind the scenes, avoid creating escalation narratives, and ensure no “villain” emerges that could justify U.S. action.
At the same time, Europe should prepare for greater volatility in global energy markets, and a higher degree of strategic uncertainty. This reinforces the need to immediately strengthen Europe’s own political, economic, and military capabilities.
We have long warned that Europe risks becoming a secondary geopolitical player in the new age of power politics. Quietly hoping for a return to the post war consensus is not an option.
For further information contact Rasmussen Global’s Senior Advisor, Nico Lange via nla@rasmussenglobal.com or our Senior Communications Director, Daniel Puglisi via dpu@rasmussenglobal.com