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# **A EUROPEAN SECURITY PLAN FOR UKRAINE: RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE OUR COMMON SECURITY**

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The return of Donald Trump to the White House will fundamentally alter the transatlantic approach to Ukraine. In order for this new approach to secure an acceptable resolution to the war, Europe and Ukraine must rally together and strike a deal with the Trump administration that is mutually beneficial.

With Ukraine as the litmus test of a new, transactional transatlantic relationship, Europe must demonstrate its willingness to underwrite many of the costs and risks of European security in return for the US maintaining its strategic investment in Europe. This should include shouldering most of the cost of Ukraine's security in exchange for the US providing recalibrated but strategically important support. Europe must simultaneously demonstrate to the Trump administration that the Indo-Pacific theatre starts in Ukraine and that Europe is a committed partner to the US in its geopolitical competition with China.

Below are **three sets of recommendations** for the structure of a workable agreement between Europe, Ukraine, and the new US administration.

## 1. A NEW TRANSATLANTIC BURDEN-SHARING FORMULA

Currently, Europe provides more than half of all military and non-military aid to Ukraine. However, the president-elect has been clear that the current formulation is and will remain unacceptable. Europe must now come forward with a new funding proposal if it is to convince the Trump administration to stay engaged in the long-term—both in Ukraine and across Europe. This should involve a gradual transition to a 70-30 burden-sharing formula.

- **European allies should commit to spending 3 per cent of GDP on their defence and security, of which 0.5 per cent should be allocated to support Ukraine.** This would represent aid of roughly 100 billion euros per year, compared to US military aid of \$45.5 billion per year from February 2022 to September 2024. In parallel, Europe must finally **seize frozen Russian assets** estimated at **300 billion euros**, which mostly reside in the EU, and utilize them for the funding the defence of Ukraine.
- As part of this agreement, Europe should seek the commitment of the United States to provide a reduced **30 per cent of military aid to Ukraine** for the long-term, which should primarily comprise equipment and capabilities that only the US can provide at scale—such as air defence.
- **A coalition of European states, led by France and the United Kingdom, should deploy military trainers and advisers to western Ukraine.** This multinational coalition would support Ukrainian forces now and demonstrate to Washington that Europe will shoulder the burden for future peace enforcement deployments. This train-and-advise mission should be augmented by border NATO allies extending their air defence capabilities to cover western Ukraine and free up Ukrainian air defence assets for use where they are needed most.
- In the long term, Europe will commit with other G7 members to fund Ukraine's reconstruction. As part of a new burden-sharing agreement with the United States, **US companies should be eligible to take part in reconstruction projects and access Ukraine's vast deposits of critical raw materials.**



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## 2. RAMPING UP ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON RUSSIA AND CHINA

The EU has adopted 14 Russia sanctions packages since 2022. However, enforcement has been a challenge, including when closing loopholes to re-exports from third countries. When it comes to China, European policy has been confusingly fragmented as member states and institutions seek to thread the needle between Washington and Beijing. Europe must more clearly align with United States and the new administration's broader foreign policy aims in the Pacific in order to secure the continued support of the United States in Europe.

- To exert greater leverage on Putin and provide a visible win to the new administration, **Europe must support US-led efforts to reduce Russia's profits from sales of oil and gas**, which should include **Europe replacing its Russian LNG imports with US imports**.
- In the long term, Europe and Ukraine should look at a **lend-lease style agreement** with the United States to cover the costs of long-term US military assistance to Kyiv.
- **The European Union should also work with the incoming US administration on developing new sanctions options**, in line with the "maximum pressure" strategy outlined by many of the president-elect's advisors. Given Russia's trade ties remain more significant with Europe than the United States, **new alignment between US and EU sanctions** would simultaneously remove many of the divergences and contradictions between respective sanctions regimes.
- Europe should simultaneously **join the United States in sanctioning Chinese companies that support Russia's war effort**, as well as impose secondary sanctions along the lines of those already imposed by the US. The European Union should also appoint a **tariff tsar** to work closely with their US counterpart and coordinate responses to aggressive Chinese trade policy and product dumping. Taken together, these measures should be part of a renewed effort by European leaders to make clear to Beijing that any attempt to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by force would be met with a strong, united, and coordinated response from Europe.

## 3. REAFFIRMING COMMITMENT TO UKRAINE'S EU and NATO FUTURE

Republicans and Democrats both view EU membership as the best pathway for Europe to take greater responsibility for the future of Ukraine. This would include mobilising billions of euros in taxpayers' money for Ukraine's reform and reconstruction. However, NATO membership is seen as a step too far by many in Washington. Europe must present the president-elect with a clear plan that demonstrates why NATO membership is essential both to securing peace and to the security of Ukraine's EU future.

- EU leaders should move forward with **Ukraine's EU accession talks and continue to press Kyiv to continue its reforms**. This will secure Ukraine's long-term economic and political future.
- Yet while EU leaders have committed to Ukraine becoming a member of the EU, they must impress on Washington that **EU membership is not feasible without strong security guarantees for Kyiv**.
- The most effective security guarantee remains NATO membership for Ukraine. Until Ukraine is a member of the EU and NATO, a coalition of **European states should offer Ukraine robust security guarantees as an interim measure based on the Ukraine Compact**. These guarantees should include lend-lease, an air defence shield, and non-combat troops on the ground as set out above. In conjunction, to secure Ukraine's EU future, Europe should seek the United States' support to extend a NATO invitation to Ukraine at The Hague Summit on 24<sup>th</sup> June 2025.